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This paper traces the effects which federal policy has had on home mortgage 
finance in the United States.  In the past, the phases of intervention have been described 
as 1) the New Deal responses to the Great Depression, 2) the creation of the Government-
Sponsored Enterprises and promotion of the secondary m ket, and 3) the deregulation of 
the banking industry.  This paper uses the historical backdrop to examine the current era 
of intervention, including the Making Home Affordable initiative.  The paper concludes 
with policy recommendations that tie past experience with current problems and explores 
shared equity homeownership as a sustainable model for the future.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This paper aims to trace and contextualize federal policy interventions in US 
mortgage finance.  It will examine the circumstances surrounding each era of intervention 
and the policy tools and approaches that were employed.  Since the 1930s, the United 
States housing finance system has evolved dramatically over time, shaped largely by 
increasing levels of government intervention and regulation.  The history starts with the 
Great Depression and New Deal Era, focusing on the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation 
(HOLC), Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), and the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA).  The late 1940s and 50s were a period of relative stability, in which the savings 
and loan industry was the major player in the housing finance arena.  In the late 1960s, 
liquidity problems threatened the housing finance system and federal legislation again 
intervened to free up credit and increase liquidity in the market through the secondary 
market institutions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, also known as the GSEs.  Beginning 
in the early 1980s, several major pieces of legislation were passed which significantly 
deregulated the financial industry.  With these changes, the housing finance landscape 
changed dramatically, leading to the decline of the thrifts, the growth of the secondary 
market and the entrance of new players into the market.  The final section of this analysis 
will address the current situation using the historcal background of past interventions.  It 
will also review the Making Home Affordable initiatve and present a recommendation 
for shared equity homeownership as a sustainable model f r the future.   
Why Housing? 
According to former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Andrew 
Cuomo,    “Housing is more than just bricks and mortar; it is the building block of 
community, it is powerfully tied to civic behavior—to working together with neighbors 
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on shared concerns, to literally making us a part of a block, a neighborhood, a town, a 
county, a nation.  Homeownership makes us stakeholdrs in something grander than 
ourselves.”1 In the United States, housing is many things; much more than simply a 
source of shelter, it is also a shaper of urban form, a marker of citizenship, and a major 
investment device.  Owning a home is one of the most pervasive and meaningful symbols 
in the United States and is widely regarded as the “American Dream,” a symbol of 
success and belonging in American culture.  The house is also a center of family life, and 
its location is a major determinant of access to transportation, employment, and social 
and educational opportunities.  Finally, housing is a major sector of the US economy, 
accounting for over a fifth of the nation’s gross domestic product.2  For all of these 
reasons, both individuals and the federal government have a vested interest in the housing 
sector.   
This paper does not seek to address the question of whether homeownership 
should be a preferential tenure choice to renting but, rather, builds on the fundamental 
assumption that homeownership is beneficial to at le st some households at some points 
in time. Among the well-documented effects of homeownership are longer tenure in a 
unit, more work and assets invested in maintaining a d improving the unit, and a broad 
range of social behaviors linked to good citizenship.  Because the house represents such a 
large portion of most homeowners’ wealth, they have  large economic incentive to 
improve the quality of the neighborhood.  Homeowners have decreased mobility, and 
therefore have a greater stake in their neighborhoods than do renters.3  Homeownership 
                                                
1 Coulson, Housing Policy and the Social Benefits of Homeownership, 6 
2 Schwartz, Housing Policy in the United States: An Introduction, 3 
3 Glaeser and Sacerdote, “The Social Consequences of Housing,” 3 
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has also been linked to positive outcomes for children, including higher educational 
achievement and lower incidence of behavioral problems.4 
In addition to social benefits, homeownership is widely promoted on the basis of 
its economic benefits.  One of the major benefits which homeownership provides is 
wealth accumulation in the form of home equity.  In the United States, home equity 
makes up more than half of household wealth for half of the homeowner population.5  
Low-income homeowners under age 65 have about twelve times greater wealth than their 
renting counterparts, showing how important homeownership is for wealth accumulation 
for low-income families.6   
 
The Role of Housing Finance 
Because housing has so many functions, “housing policy” has taken many forms.    
Housing policy has traditionally taken three major approaches.  Most policy has been 
undertaken through the tax code, the authorization and supervision of the credit market, 
and via direct subsidy.  Housing is one of the lumpiest and most expensive goods 
purchased by most households, and it is typically purchased through a combination of 
debt and equity.  Because most home purchases in the United States are dependent on the 
availability of financing to complete the transaction, housing finance has become a major 
point of policy intervention in the housing markets.  The availability of credit is not only 
significant to a household’s ability to purchase a house, but also to its wealth-building 
potential, as leverage has historically increased th  returns on housing well beyond those 
                                                
4 Coulson, Housing Policy and the Social Benefits of Homeownership, 6 
5 Siniavskaia, Homeownership, Financial Flexibility, and Wealth 
6 Collins, Retsinas, and Belsky, Towards a Targeted Homeownership Tax Credit, 2 
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of the stock market, making it a preferential investment.7  This preferential treatment of 
housing relative to other investments will be furthe  discussed at the end of this analysis. 
Beginning with the National Housing Act of 1934, the federal government played 
a major role in the evolution of the housing finance system in the United States.  Through 
a variety of means, federal policies have helped to make credit accessible and affordable 
to a continuously expanding population, pushing up the homeownership rate.  In 1965, 
just over 63 percent of Americans were homeowners.  This figure continued to rise until 
it peaked at 69.2 percent in 2004, before falling back to 67.5 percent in 2008.8  Obscured 
within these figures is the disparity in homeownership levels based on demographics, 
especially race and wealth. 
Along with an increase in the number of households wning their own home, 
there has also been an increase in the number of house lds who use credit to purchase 
their home.  This increase has come from two directions.  The first is expanded access to 
credit, as underwriting requirements have been loosened, allowing buyers who did not fit 
the traditional profile to qualify for loans.  The s cond is the liberalization of the terms 
under which credit is issued, which has brought borrowing within reach of more 
households.  This was initially done by lowering interest rates and other fees associated 
with borrowing, but in recent years has shifted towards more exotic terms that lower 
downpayments, reduce or eliminate monthly principal payments, and provide additional 
flexibility in loan repayment options.  Various federal policies have been aimed primarily 
at either expanding access to credit or liberalization of underwriting standards.  
                                                
7 Schwartz, Housing Policy in the United States: An Introduction, 255 
8 US Bureau of the Census, Housing and Vacancy Survey 
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Toward a Taxonomy of Housing Policy 
Allen Hays divides housing policy into three categories.  The first, social welfare 
is “any program which utilizes public resources…to alleviate problems confronted by 
individuals and families which are considered beyond their capacity to deal with on their 
own.”9 These policies include public housing and many of the other programs intended to 
subsidize housing costs for low- and middle-income households.   The second category, 
community development policy, is “the process by which a geographic or political entity 
improves the quality of its physical structures, its economic life, and its social 
relationships.”10  These policies include neighborhood-level approaches to housing, 
including the removal of blight and infrastructure improvements such as transportation 
and parks that increase the location value of housing.  The final type of policy is 
macroeconomic policy, which deals with the economy as a whole.  It is under this 
category that interventions in mortgage finance prima ly fall.  These interventions have 
been intended to boost the economy through increased employment and liquidity in the 
market.   
Through an analysis of historic policies, this paper will argue that the treatment of 
these objectives as distinct entities rather than as a l rger, interconnected whole has led to 
socially and economically suboptimal outcomes.  By maintaining the distinctions 
between each of these interests, federal policy has placed them in competition, and often 
even in opposition, with one another, rather than approaching them with holistic policies 
that actively promote multiple goals simultaneously.  Macroeconomic policies have not 
only received greater attention than social welfare nd community development goals, 
but have also been enacted to the detriment of these other interests.   
                                                
9 Hays, The Federal Government and Urban Housing: Ideology and Change in Public Policy, 25 
10 Ibid., 35 
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Federal interventions in housing finance have been almost entirely directed at 
macroeconomic objectives.   In this way, much of the policy that affects housing is not 
typically considered to be “housing policy.”  While policies that fall into this category 
often have secondary effects that fulfill the goals of social welfare and community 
development, that is not their primary purpose.  The most commonly cited example is the 
authorization of the Federal Housing Administration u der the New Deal, which was 
intended primarily to spur activity in the building sector, a major piece of the economy at 
the time.  Though it is certainly true that many households were able to become 
homeowners as a result of this program, this was not the primary intent.  Over time, 
macroeconomic policy affecting housing has become increasingly distanced from 
policies focused on social and community development goals.  The current foreclosure 
crisis is an opportunity to reverse this trend and realign issues of social welfare and 
community development with macroeconomic policies.   
  
 15 
Chapter 2: The Great Depression and the Origins of Federal 
Intervention in Mortgage Finance 
 
The Early Years 
 Formal mortgage finance in the United States began with “Terminating” Building 
Societies, in which members pooled funds in order to make loans to one another for home 
construction.  Lending terms and credit risks were controlled by the group, and once 
everyone had received a loan the organization was dis olved.  In the 1850s, these 
societies became “Permanent” Building Societies, and eventually evolved into what 
today are known as savings and loans.11  Under these arrangements, loans were typically 
not self-amortizing, and were made for an average period of 6-10 years, after which time 
the borrower would be forced to refinance.  In addition, these loans had variable interest 
rates and maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of about 50 percent, requiring that 
borrowers provide significant cash down payments and have income levels high enough 
to absorb interest rate fluctuations.   Combined, these characteristics placed large capital 
requirements on borrowers, while also saddling them with most of the commensurate 
risk.   
 During the economic boom of the 1920s, the US housing finance system 
expanded dramatically, and new sources of capital, including insurance companies, 
entered the market.  Though mortgage capital had becom  much more readily available, 
the terms of the loans were highly troublesome for bor owers.  Loans were typically still 
made for very short terms, forcing homeowners to refinance frequently.  Additionally, the 
loans did not amortize, leaving owners to make a “bullet” payment of the entire principal 
                                                
11 Office of Policy Development and Research, “Evoluti n of the U.S. Housing Finance System: A 
Historical Survey and Lessons for Emerging Mortgage Markets,” 3 
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at the end of the term.    Most loans also carried variable interest rates, creating an 
additional source of uncertainty for borrowers.12  
 
The Great Depression 
The end of the 1920s and the beginning of the Great Depression sent major 
shocks through the housing market.  As unemployment rose, borrowers struggled to make 
their loan payments.  Between 1931 and 1935, there was an average of 250,000 
foreclosures per year.13  At the worst point, 10 percent of homes were in foreclosure.  At 
the same time, economic deflation caused 50 percent declines in home values, making it 
difficult to recover the outstanding loan balance from the sale of the home.  Further 
deflating home values was the overabundance of supply on the market; between 1929 and 
1932, 2.5 million new housing units were created, far outpacing the population increase 
of 1 million households.14  Together, these factors created serious liquidity problems for 
the entire housing finance system.15  
As effective demand for housing dwindled, so, too, did the construction 
industries.  From their peak in 1925, new home starts had dropped 90 percent by 1933.16  
In testimony before Congress, the Roosevelt administration argued that the loss of jobs 
from construction related industries made up one third of the nation’s unemployment.  
Stimulating housing demand was, therefore, seen as integral to stimulating the larger 
                                                
12 Green and Wachter, “The American Mortgage in Histor cal and International Context,” 94 
13 Ibid., 94 
14 Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transformation of the U.S. Housing Finance System, 
2 
15 Office of Policy Development and Research, “Evoluti n of the U.S. Housing Finance System: A 
Historical Survey and Lessons for Emerging Mortgage Markets,” 5 
16 Weiss, “Marketing and Financing Home Ownership: Mortgage Lending and Public Policy in the United 
States, 1918-1989,” 112 
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economy as a whole.17  The largest constraint to effective housing demand, however, was 
the inability of households to secure financing.  Savings and loans, the primary source of 
mortgage financing, had pulled back their lending, leaving the market for mortgage credit 
dry.   
In the early days, the savings and loans had restricted their business largely to 
investments in mortgage loans.  Because of their singular focus, they had become closely 
allied with the building and construction industries, as their needs were inextricably 
linked.  Just as the thrifts enabled demand for the products of the construction industry, 
the construction industry created lending opportunities for the savings and loans.  These 
alliances came into play any time political issues were raised, with the construction 
industry firmly supporting thrifts.18  However, this relationship did not continue 
unchallenged for long.  Thrifts argued that, since mortgage lending was their primary 
business, they should be the target of government assist nce.  Although the construction 
industry supported assistance for the thrifts, they also supported measures aimed at 
assisting other mortgage lenders, causing the first cracks in this relationship.19      
 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
To deal with the crisis, President Hoover called for a system of Home Loan 
Discount Banks to rescue the beleaguered financial institutions, jumpstart the 
construction industry and the larger economy, and “create a structure for the promotion of 
homeownership.”20  The first of the initiatives meant to achieve these goals was the 
                                                
17 Carliner, “Development of Federal Homeownership "Policy",” 305 
18 Weiss, “Marketing and Financing Home Ownership: Mortgage Lending and Public Policy in the United 
States, 1918-1989,” 111 
19 Ibid., 112 
20 Carliner, “Development of Federal Homeownership "Policy",” 305 
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creation of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), which were chartered to provide 
additional liquidity to savings and loan institutions.  Under the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Act of 1932, thrift institutions came under federal egulation for the first time.  The 
twelve regional FHLBs were initially capitalized with government funds.  Savings and 
loans which borrowed from the FHLBs were required to purchase stock, and the FHLBs 
eventually bought back the government-owned stock t become fully membership-owned 
cooperative institutions.  In addition, the FHLBs chartered federal savings and loans and 
placed restrictions on their assets and liabilities. 
The FHLB system decreased investor risk by diversifying the portfolio and 
reducing the liquidity constraints created by previous prohibitions against nationwide 
banking.21   As a result, S&Ls were able to make 10-12 year mo tgages, predominantly 
within a 50-mile radius of their home office.22  Although the FHLB system was 
successful in extending access to credit, it was only later that it would become a major 
player in the housing finance system.    
 
Home Owners Loan Corporation 
The era of substantial government intervention began in response to the 
challenges created by the Great Depression.  As unemployment skyrocketed and home 
values plunged, increasing numbers of homeowners found themselves unable to meet 
their mortgage obligations.  As the predominantly short-term, non-amortizing mortgages 
matured, many homeowners were unable to refinance their homes, as they owed more 
than their homes were worth.  Lenders, however, were weary to pursue foreclosure, as 
                                                
21 Lea, “Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit: A Historical Perspective,” 161 
22 Office of Policy Development and Research, “Evoluti n of the U.S. Housing Finance System: A 
Historical Survey and Lessons for Emerging Mortgage Markets,” 6 
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declining house values meant that they would not be a l  to recoup their investment.  
With borrowers and lenders trapped in this situation, the already scarce credit market 
dried up, intensifying the problem.   
To deal with this crisis, Congress passed the Home Owners Loan Act in 1933, 
establishing the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) to deal with the immediate 
foreclosure crisis.  The HOLC was to be a lender of last resort, and operated under the 
regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.  In order to help struggling financial 
institutions remain solvent and keep families in their homes, the HOLC purchased and 
restructured defaulting loans, reinstating them as fixed-rate, long-term (typically 20 
years), self-amortizing loans.23  By refinancing mortgages that were distressed or already 
in default, the HOLC aimed to prevent a large shakeup in the financial sector.  The 
HOLC was initially capitalized with $200 million in treasury funds, and was given the 
authority to raise up to $2 billion by issuing government-backed bonds.24 
Under the HOLC guidelines, one- to four-unit properties valued at up to $20,000 
were eligible to receive loans for up to 80 percent of their value, with maximum interest 
rates of 5 percent and fifteen-year repayment periods.25  There was extraordinary demand 
for the program; between 1933 and 1935, the HOLC receiv d 1.9 million applications for 
assistance.  Though many applications were not accepted, the need for such a program 
was clear, and by 1935, the HOLC held about 12 percent of the outstanding residential 
mortgage debt in the United States.26  It is estimated that over 60 percent of the 
mortgages refinanced by the HOLC were for homes that had lost more than 15 percent of 
                                                
23 Green and Wachter, “The American Mortgage in Histor cal and International Context,” 95 
24 Ibid., 95 
25 Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transformation of the U.S. Housing Finance System, 
4 
26 Ibid., 4 
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their value.27  In total, the HOLC refinanced nearly one million l ans across the country, 
totaling about $3.1 billion.  A large portion of this lending was done in 1934 and 1935.28   
By the end of the 1930s, the HOLC had refinanced 20 percent of all mortgaged 
properties, staving off an enormous wave of foreclosures.29  With the financial crisis 
over, the HOLC was liquidated in 1951, creating a sm ll profit.      
In general, the HOLC is regarded as a successful program.  About 20 percent of 
borrowers defaulted on their loans, but this was not unexpected since only troubled 
borrowers were eligible for the program.30   Although this requirement did result in 
incidences of moral hazard, with some borrowers intentionally defaulting on loans in 
order to take advantage of the bailout, there is overwhelming evidence that there was a 
true need for the program.31  To its credit, the HOLC was able to prevent the foreclosure 
of 750,000 homes and shore up a struggling financial system and the badly damaged 
institutions within it.  The most lasting legacy of the HOLC, however, is in the precedents 
that it set: 1) the introduction of the long-term, fixed-rate, self-amortizing mortgage to the 
marketplace, 2) the structure of the mortgage lending industry, and 3) the federal 
government’s role in the support and regulation of housing finance.32  
Unlike many of the programs that would follow it, the HOLC had explicit goals 
of assisting both the troubled financial industry and imperiled homeowners.  While many 
subsequent programs did, in fact, aid both lenders and borrowers, the HOLC’s dual stated 
                                                
27 Ely, “The Resolution Trust Corporation in Historical Perspective,” 54 
28 Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, “The Origins of Modern Housing Finance: The Impact of Federal 
Housing Programs During the Great Depression,” 4 
29 Ibid., 7 
30 Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transformation of the U.S. Housing Finance System, 
4 
31 Office of Policy Development and Research, “Evoluti n of the U.S. Housing Finance System: A 
Historical Survey and Lessons for Emerging Mortgage Markets,” 5 
32 Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transformation of the U.S. Housing Finance System, 
32. 
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goals make it stand apart.  At the same time, however, the program created a federal 
incentive to homeownership, furthering the roles that omeownership and housing 
finance would play in the future of the US economy.33   
 
Federal Housing Administration 
The Roosevelt Administration came into power at a time when the entire nation 
was struggling with the economic crisis.  Under theN w Deal’s economic recovery 
efforts, Congress passed the National Housing Act of 1934.  Included in the Act were 
provisions intended to stimulate home building activities, a large portion of the economy.  
Title I was a temporary measure which provided unsecured loans of up to $2,000 for 
remodeling, a direct attempt to create jobs in thissector.  The most important element in 
the new legislation, however, was Title II, which charged the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) with the task of providing mortgage insurance for new homes and 
for purchasing/financing existing homes.  
Mortgage insurance was intended to lower the risk which financial institutions 
faced when underwriting mortgages, allowing them to increase the amount and extend 
the length of their financing commitments.  Up to this point, only private mortgage 
insurance had been available, but firms offering this insurance were largely unsuccessful.  
These firms were significantly undercapitalized, and most went out of business during the 
crisis of the 1930s.34  One primary advantage that allowed for the success of the FHA 
model was its nationwide scope, which allowed it to diversify risk across local mortgage 
markets.35 
                                                
33 Green and Wachter, “The American Mortgage in Histor cal and International Context,” 95 
34 Ibid., 95 
35 Lea, “Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit: A Historical Perspective,” 162 
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In order to minimize direct outlays, the FHA was backed by a mutual mortgage 
insurance fund, capitalized with premiums equivalent to .5 percent of the insured 
outstanding loan balance, which were paid by the borrower.  Policies were written for 
mortgages following the precedents set by the HOLC, allowing LTVs up to 80 percent on 
properties appraised under $20,000 at 5 percent interest amortizing over twenty years.36  
Rather than liberalizing standards to expand the base of homeownership, however, the 
FHA introduced stricter standards, intended to reduc  their risk exposure and minimize 
the number of claims filed.   
As a result, in the early years of the program, FHA insurance went predominantly 
to middle- and upper-income households.  In the 1930s, most of the insurance policies 
were written for families earning between $2,000 and $2,500, much more than the 
average full-time wage of $1,500.37  Higher income households were also given more 
favorable terms, with lower down payments and longer repayment periods.  Overall, this 
allowed them to purchase more expensive homes, providing an additional stimulus to the 
building trades.  
The underwriting standards put in place by the FHA also placed limitations on the 
types of properties that could be insured.  For each policy written, the FHA required strict 
appraisals, high construction standards, and escrow of tax and insurance payments.  Only 
homes in “homogenous” neighborhoods were eligible, and the underwriting standards 
encouraged the use of racially restrictive covenants to maintain neighborhood 
segregation.38  Residential segregation was widely pursued, and over 30 percent of the 
                                                
36 Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transformation of the U.S. Housing Finance System, 
5 
37 Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, “The Origins of Modern Housing Finance: The Impact of Federal 
Housing Programs During the Great Depression,” 3 
38 Carliner, “Development of Federal Homeownership "Policy",” 306 
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new homes built during the 1930s had FHA insurance.39  It was not until the 1960s that 
the FHA reversed its official racially biased lendig practices.   
For nearly 30 years, FHA policies had been based on macroeconomic 
considerations, focusing on risk and the bottom line needed to maintain profitability.  The 
FHA was not intended to broaden the reach of credit, bu  rather to reduce the risk of 
losses faced by lenders.  While promoting homeownership for a sector of the population, 
the FHA further excluded low-income and minority borrowers by tightening underwriting 
standards against borrowers and neighborhoods deeme to be risky.  It is clear that social 
welfare and community development goals were not actively pursued under the auspices 
of the FHA at its inception.      
 
Federal National Mortgage Association 
Also contained in the National Housing Act of 1934 was Title III, which 
authorized nationally chartered mortgage associations.  These organizations were 
intended to purchase FHA-insured mortgages for sale in a secondary market.  Although it 
was not as significant as Title II at the time, Title III paved the way for the creation in 
1938 of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), later to be known as Fannie 
Mae.  Fannie Mae was originally intended to buy FHA- and VA-backed loans by 
borrowing funds in areas where financial institutions had significant deposits and 
redistributing this capital by buying mortgages in areas where savings were low.40  It was 
not until the 1970s and 80s, however, that FNMA andthe secondary market came to be 
major players in the US housing finance system.   
                                                
39 Colton, Housing Finance in the United States: The Transformation of the U.S. Housing Finance System, 
7 




The federal government interventions in the housing market in the 1930s forever 
changed the nature of the housing market and the housing finance system in the United 
States.  Before that time, federal policy had not played a significant role in the housing 
sector.  Through the creation of the FHLB, HOLC, and FHA, however, the federal 
government inserted itself into the system, creating a precedent for future involvement in 
difficult financial circumstances.  The HOLC and FHA fundamentally changed the form 
of standard mortgages, extending their length, lowering down payment requirements, and 
lowering their interest rates.  Between the 1920s and the late 1930s, average mortgage 
maturity terms increased by 55 percent while loan to value ratios increased 16 percent 
and interest rates fell by about 15 percent.41   
The FHA has been credited with restoring confidence, and, thereby, liquidity to 
the housing finance system after the Great Depression.  Though the economy as a whole 
benefited from these programs, not everyone benefitd equally.  It was mostly higher 
income households that received the direct benefits o  the programs.  FHA insurance 
policies were written only for low-risk loans, allowing it to maintain a low rate of default.  
These strict underwriting criteria would later be th  source of significant controversy as 
they created and propagated economic inequalities. In addition to these critiques, there is 
also evidence that the FHA did not have a statistically significant effect on 
homeownership rates in its early years.  Only upper-income households were able to 
access FHA insurance, and many of them would have been able to purchase houses even 
without the program.  Therefore, the base of households who were able to purchase their 
                                                
41 Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, “The Origins of Modern Housing Finance: The Impact of Federal 
Housing Programs During the Great Depression,” 7 
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homes was not significantly expanded by the program in the 1930s, and social welfare 
and community development ideals were left by the wayside.42    
 Expanding the base of homeownership, however, was not the primary purpose of 
the 1930s legislation.  The federal government had not previously played a role in 
housing finance.  In response to the unprecedented challenges created by the Great 
Depression and the general economic collapse, however, the federal government was 
forced to intervene.  Acting in response to the financial pressures of the time, the 
government sought to restore liquidity to the financi l sector and boost demand for the 
construction industry.  These policies were crafted through a macroeconomic lens, not as 
social welfare programs or efforts to further community development.  Together, all of 
the efforts of the 1930s sought to broaden the institutional basis for mortgage finance, 
bringing new players into the market to increase and stabilize the supply of capital 
available to fund residential mortgages.  New Deal policies did not seek to determine 
who would benefit from the increased liquidity or how it would be used. 
This involvement came at a time when the federal government was expanding in 
many sectors.  Under the auspices of New Deal programs, the federal government took 
on a larger role in many social and economic initiatives.  The HOLC is a textbook 
example of a “big government” program, by which thepublic sector invested directly to 
meet its aims, rather than using incentives and regulation to encourage the private sector 
to achieve these outcomes.   As a result of the Great D pression and the complete chaos 
gripping the private sector at the time, there was ideological acceptance of such a strategy 
in the 1930s.  The shift towards big government wasalready waning, however, by the 
time the FHA was created.  Though the FHA was created s a public agency, its purpose 
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was to encourage confidence in the private financial sector, which would in turn engender 
demand for the construction and building trades.    
The landscape of the housing finance system which would stay in place for 
several decades to come was established in this period.  Savings and loans would play a 
major role, partially due to restrictions on their portfolios which precluded them from 
holding corporate loans, bonds, and equity issues.  They also received incentives through 
the tax code to maintain a majority of their portfolio in residential mortgages.  
Meanwhile, commercial banks, life insurance companies, and the secondary market also 
began to contribute capital towards funding mortgages, and outstanding mortgage debt 
ballooned.43 
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Chapter 3: Government Sponsored Enterprises and the Secondary 
Market 
Through the 1940s and 1950s, the US housing finance system remained largely 
unchanged. The efforts of the 1930s had been successful in broadening the mortgage 
finance marketplace, and, in 1950, savings and loans held 36 percent of outstanding 
residential mortgage debt, while life insurance companies and commercial banks each 
held about 20 percent.44  During this period, savings and loans paid an average of 3.9 
percent on deposits, higher than the 2.8 percent offered by commercial banks and only 
slightly lower than the 4.1 percent average return on 20-year bonds.45  FHA insurance 
remained an important element, encouraging lenders to continue making long-term, self-
amortizing mortgages.  By the late 1950s, however, private firms began to enter the 
mortgage insurance market, undercutting prices and ending the monopoly of the FHA.  
Between 1957 and 1973, enabling statutes for private insurance were passed in every 
state, creating competition and leading to the declin  of the FHA’s market share over the 
next two decades.46  As a result, the FHA share of the mortgage insurance marketplace 
dropped from 29.4 percent in 1970 to less than 10 percent in the 1990s.47 
As the mortgage marketplace changed and expanded, it became increasingly 
apparent that local deposits, the traditional source of mortgage funds, were insufficient to 
meet the growing demand.  To increase the flow of credit to the mortgage marketplace, 
Congress chartered several organizations, intended to link mortgage markets with world-
wide capital markets.  These agencies, called governm nt-sponsored entities (GSEs), 
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bridged the gap between the public and private sectors, and served as an additional source 
of subsidy from the federal government to the housing ector.  
 
Reauthorization of Fannie Mae 
From its inception in 1938 through the 1950s, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association was not a major player in the US housing fi ance system.  The Housing Act 
of 1934 had allowed for the creation of private mortgage associations to create a 
secondary market for home loans, but none had formed.  In 1938, the Roosevelt 
Administration created the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) as a 
government agency to fulfill this role.  In its original form, FNMA issued bonds for 
purchasing mortgages at par, which expanded the geographic basis of mortgage funding, 
allowing investors to buy mortgages in areas where inv stment capital was scarce.48  In 
the postwar era, it also sought to increase the availability of credit by acting as a portfolio 
lender, putting it in direct competition with the S&Ls.   
The Housing Act of 1954, in response to the economic recession, renewed the 
charter of Fannie Mae, as it had become known, and charged it with “retarding or 
stopping a decline in mortgage lending and home building activities which threatens 
materially the stability of a high level economy.”49   In that same year, the FNMA Charter 
Act ended Fannie Mae’s direct lending activities, leaving it only as a buyer and seller of 
mortgages on the secondary market.  Its public purpose was renewed, with special 
requirements that the company buy certain mortgages, especially to support low-income 
housing.  The 1958 Emergency Housing Act and the Housing Act of 1961 again relied on 
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the agency, increasing its funding in order to put more money into its special assistance 
functions.50   
 
Regulation Q and Interest Rate Fluctuations 
Up until this point, most mortgages had been funded through commercial banks 
and savings and loans.  Because these institutions were insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which 
carried the guarantee of the full faith and credit of the federal government, they were able 
to access inexpensive funds.  At this time, the yield on Treasury bills never rose above 4 
percent, and 30-year fixed mortgages typically paid between 5 and 6 percent, providing 
investors with a safe investment while still earning higher yields than those of Treasury 
bills.  Even during this time, however, there was concern that the industry was exposed to 
significant interest rate risk.  Starting in the 1950s, there were several attempts to shield 
S&Ls from interest rate risk through the introduction of adjustable-rate mortgages, but 
federal and state governments repeatedly blocked thse attempts, arguing that individual 
households were not able to bear such substantial risk.51  
In 1966, however, the industry’s fears were realized as the yield on short-term 
Treasury notes rose above four percent, and investors rapidly shifted their funds away 
from savings and loans and into Treasury bills.  This s ift resulted in a severe shortage of 
funds available for funding mortgages.52  In addition, the savings and loans had 
“borrowed short” and “lent long,” adding to the crunch.  While their cost of funds 
increased, they were only able to charge higher rates on new mortgages, further 
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squeezing the spread between current deposits and existing mortgages.  As a result of the 
finance crunch, new housing starts dropped 18 percent in 1966.53  Another attempt to 
maintain the solvency of the thrifts was the introduction of Regulation Q in 1966, which 
placed caps on the interest rates that thrifts were allowed to pay on deposits.  Although 
this addressed competition between thrifts, it also created significant cash flow problems 
when market rates rose beyond the cap and thrifts were no longer able to compete against 
other investments.    
In the late 1960s, it became increasingly clear that t e regulatory structures put in 
place during the New Deal were no longer appropriate.  The inflationary environment of 
the era severely threatened the thrift institutions, which had been encouraged to specialize 
in long-term, fixed-rate lending.  In 1970, to aid the thrifts, the President’s Commission 
on Financial Structure and Regulation (also known as the Hunt Commission) 
recommended the removal of interest rate ceilings on deposits and the expansion of their 
investment powers.  Although these recommendations were not immediately adopted, 
they set off a debate in Congress that would last for several years.54   
 
Civil Unrest 
Along with the financial crisis, the late 1960s were a time of social unrest.  Under 
President Johnson, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (also known as 
the Kerner Commission) was appointed to study the problems facing America’s cities.  In 
their report, released in 1968, they identified housing as one of the most significant 
problems, saying that “Homeownership…would provide many low-income households 
                                                
53 Doan, American Housing Production, 1880-2000: A Concise History, 91. 
54 Ibid., 92 
 31 
with a tangible stake in society for the first time.”55  Along with recommendations for 
subsidized housing for low-income households, the Commission placed a strong 
emphasis on increasing housing production, reflecting the slowdown in new construction 
starts that took place earlier in the decade. 
 
Restructuring the Secondary Market 
Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae 
In response to the dual social and financial crises, Congress passed the Housing 
and Urban Development Act of 1968, restructuring the Federal National Mortgage 
Association.  Out of Fannie Mae, they created two separate entities: the Government 
National Mortgage Association (GNMA), Ginnie Mae, and a new Fannie Mae.  Ginnie 
Mae was created as a government agency to perform the “special assistance” functions of 
the former Fannie Mae.  In addition, Ginnie Mae was authorized to guarantee mortgage-
backed securities issued by private lenders.  The new Fannie Mae, however, was spun off 
as a private entity.  It was given the designation of a “government-sponsored enterprise” 
and was authorized to purchase FHA and VA loans, as well as to act as a portfolio 
lender.56  By making Fannie Mae a private entity, the federal government was able to 
remove Fannie Mae’s debt from its own balance sheet.  In 1970, Congress granted Fannie 
Mae approval to purchase conventional mortgages.  In that same year, Ginnie Mae began 
issuing securities backed by pools of FHA and VA loans, upon which it guaranteed 
interest and principal payments.  It was not until 1981 that Fannie Mae issued its first 
mortgage-backed securities. 
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 In 1970, Congress chartered the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 
Freddie Mac, to create a secondary market for conventional mortgages originated by 
savings and loan institutions.  The main purpose of Freddie Mac was to prevent Fannie 
Mae from operating as a monopoly.  In 1971, Freddie Mac began issuing Mortgage 
Participation Certificates, securities created from bundled conventional loans, which paid 
monthly principal and interest payments to investors. 
By 1977, savings and loans had nearly doubled theirmarket share of outstanding 
residential mortgage debt to 65 percent, while life insurance companies’ share decreased 
to below 5 percent.57  This shift is largely due to the emergence of the secondary market 
and the rising demand for mortgage-backed securities.  Federal regulations had also 
provided assistance for new small lenders, such as mortgage brokers.  In contrast, as 
interest rates rose in the 1970s, Regulation Q becam  a serious impediment to the thrifts, 
with deposits flowing towards newly created money market accounts that offered higher 
yields than those which the thrifts could offer.   
 
Conclusions 
After the Great Depression and before the late 1960s, US housing policy was 
shaped almost entirely by financial policy.  Macroec nomic concerns guided federal 
intervention in banking, with an emphasis on maintaining the liquidity of the credit 
markets and the competitiveness of the savings and loans.  When interest rate fluctuations 
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threatened the solvency of the S&Ls, Congress turned to the secondary market.  The 
GSEs were chartered in order to create a secondary m rket for home loans and to prevent 
the liquidity problems of 1966 from recurring.   
By the late 1960s, social concerns were clearly at the forefront of political debates 
as urban riots tore cities apart.  While increasing housing supplies was a motivating factor 
in the creation of the GSEs, the resulting policy was not social welfare or community 
development policy.  Rather, it was macroeconomic policy, aimed at the security of the 
private financial sector.  These programs were not targeted directly to address living 
conditions or segregation. 
It is important to note that two other major pieces of legislation were passed 
following this period.  The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was passed in 1975, requiring 
lenders to report the quantity and size of loans they made.  In 1989, an amendment to the 
Act required lenders to also disclose the income, racial characteristics, and sex of 
borrowers whose applications were rejected.58  The Community Reinvestment Act was 
passed in 1977, requiring lenders to meet the credit needs of the entire communities in 
which they were located.  Unlike previous policies, these were aimed at social welfare 
and community development goals, extending credit to underserved areas and requiring 
banks to report on their activities in order to effectively monitor lending patterns. 
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Chapter 4: Deregulation and the Changing Institutional Landscape 
 Along with limitations on what kind of investments they could make, thrifts had 
long received significant tax incentives to deal heavily in residential mortgages.  In 
exchange for investing primarily in housing, they were allowed to calculate loan loss 
projections at a much higher rate than would ordinarily be regarded as reasonable.  By 
doing so, they were able to transfer much of their pre-tax income into loan loss reserves, 
reducing their tax liability.  This provision was whittled away over time, with transfers of 
up to 60 percent of taxable income allowed between 1962 and 1969, 40 percent for the 
following decade, and then, as part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, down to 8 percent.59  
 As thrifts lost much of their incentives to focus on mortgage lending, the 
secondary market gained ground.  In 1977, only 4 percent of the fixed-rate mortgages 
eligible for securitization were actually securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  By 
1982, this share had increased to nearly 25 percent, and increased further to over 50 
percent in 1986 and 69 percent in 1989.60   
 
Financial Deregulation 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
In response to the fluctuations in interest rate, Congress passed the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.  As part of this legislation, 
Regulation Q, which had placed a limit on the returns which thrifts were allowed to pay 
on deposits, was phased out over a four-year period.  In addition, the Act broadened the 
investment powers of thrifts and raised the cap on individual insured depository accounts 
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to $100,000.  In 1981, federally chartered thrifts were finally authorized to issue 
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), although this change came too late for many of the 
thrifts, which had already become insolvent.  This new authority made a dramatic impact 
on the remaining thrifts, and, between 1982 and 1989, 40 percent of the new mortgages 
written had adjustable rates.61  By 1989, adjustable-rate mortgages made up 48 percent of 
the thrifts’ single-family loan portfolios.  The use of ARMs by all types of lenders grew, 
making up 43 percent of all conventional single-family loans issued between 1984 and 
1989.62   At the time, there was speculation as to whether adjustable-rate mortgages 
would become the norm once again, as they had been before the 1930s.63 
In 1982, the President’s Commission on Housing concluded that the “nation can 
no longer rely so completely on a system of highly regulated and specialized mortgage 
investors and a single type of mortgage instrument if the strong underlying demand for 
housing credit is to be met.”64  This report not only set the stage for further deregulation 
of the financial industry, but also paved the way for the growing role that the secondary 
market would play in housing finance.   
 Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act 
That same year, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions 
Act, which increased government authority to assist the thrifts and once again broadened 
their investment powers.  Together, these provisions were intended to help the thrifts to 
compete for deposits.  Under the Garn-St. Germain Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) were 
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authorized to issue government-backed promissory notes t  those thrifts that were not in 
danger of collapse, temporarily increasing their net assets. Acting under this new 
authority, the FDIC and FSLIC invested over $175 million into fifteen S&Ls by January 
of 1983.65  In addition, the Act loosened restrictions on theypes of investments which 
thrifts were authorized to make, allowing them to diversify away from their traditional 
emphasis on mortgage lending.  Thrifts were given the power to invest up to 10 percent 
of their assets in corporate, commercial, and agricultural loans, up to 30 percent in 
consumer loans, and up to 40 percent in nonresidential mortgage loans.66   
These changes had significant political ramifications, breaking down the 
traditional alliances between the construction and building industries with the thrifts.  As 
thrifts began to divert significant portions of their investments into non-residential assets, 
these partnerships lost strength, weakening the overall housing lobby.  Along with this 
breakdown, there was a movement to diversify the inv stment portfolio of the United 
States, moving capital away from housing and towards other sectors of the economy 
which were thought to be more effective levers of economic stimulation.67     
FIRREA 
Over the short term, the Garn-St. Germain legislation was extremely effective, 
dramatically reversing the negative net new deposits of 1981 and 1982, and bringing in 
$63 billion in net new deposits in 1983.68  The period of reinvestment was short-lived, 
however, and from 1987 to 1990, the S&L industry lost billions of dollars each year.  
With the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Fund bankrupt and the industry on the 
verge of collapse, Congress and the first Bush Administration intervened with the 
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Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).  
Under FIRREA, the federal government sought to close the insolvent institutions while 
putting in place stricter standards for the remaining ones.  Large outlays of direct funds 
and bond issuances were authorized to close the failed institutions, and higher capital 
requirements were required of all remaining institutions.  In addition, new limits were set 
on the types of investments thrifts were allowed to make, as well as requirements for 
uniform accounting practices and increased penalties for fraud.    
Large organizational changes were made, replacing the discredited regulators with 
new structures; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was replaced with the Office of 
Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Housing Finance Board was created to oversee the 
twelve Federal Home Loan Banks.  With increasing deregulation and the declining 
importance of S&Ls in mortgage finance, mortgage bankers and the secondary markets 
became significantly more important.  With these changes, however, housing finance lost 
its pool of cheap funds, its local orientation, and its reliance on long-term, fixed-rate 
mortgages.69      
 
Resolution Trust Corporation 
The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was created un er the FDIC to handle 
the assets and liabilities of those thrifts that had become insolvent before 1992.  This role 
had been previously played twice by other organizations, the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation and the Federal Asset Disposition Associati n (FADA), which had been 
formed to liquidate the assets of the bankrupt Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
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Corporation.70  FADA had been liquidated by FIRREA in 1985.  Under FADA, 296 
thrifts, with total assets of $125 billion, were closed or sold.71  This number would be 
dwarfed, however, by the RTC.   
Though it had originally been authorized for only three years, the RTC was 
extended twice as authorities quickly realized that “the problem was far worse than 
anyone in government had envisioned.”72  Charged with disposing of assets from thrifts 
that became insolvent between 1989 and 1995, the RTC resolved 747 thrifts with $394 
billion in assets.73  By 1999, it was estimated that RTC losses amounted to $82.7 billion, 
of which $75.6 billion, or 91 percent, accrued to the public sector.  In all, direct losses 
from the savings and loan crisis between 1986 and 1995 totaled $145.7 billion, of which 
$124 billion was paid by taxpayers required to back up the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation’s commitment to depositors.74 
 
Politics of Deregulation 
 With the deregulation of the financial sector, housing finance lost the “protected” 
status it had enjoyed since the New Deal.75   Though the construction lobby had 
supported the inclusion of other types of financial institutions in the housing finance 
market, they also supported the legislation intended to rescue the remaining thrifts after 
the savings and loan crisis.  The National Association of Home Builders legislative 
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council explained their support of aid to the thrifts, saying that “We felt that half a thrift 
was better than no thrift at all.”76   
 In both the 1930s and the 1980s, the federal governm nt provided significant aid 
to the financial industry.  It is striking to note in both instances that “the government’s 
overriding aim seemed to be to support the interests of the nation’s private financial 
institutions,” not to meet public objectives.77  In a poignant remark by Lane Kirkland, 
then secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, he said “I am persuaded that the basic thrust of 
these recommendations is designed to promote the interests of private financial 
institutions without any genuine regard for the most urgent problems and needs of the 
nation.”78   
 
Growth of the Secondary Market 
In 1982, the President’s Commission on Housing was convened to assess the 
crisis.  They concluded that “Inflation and unprecedented interest rate movements have 
fundamentally damaged the system of financial intermediation that so successfully 
supported American housing for more than forty years, nd therefore a broader-based and 
more resilient system will be needed to supply the funds a strengthened housing finance 
industry will require.”79  Additionally, the report included recommendations that would 
increase the efficiency of the secondary market for residential mortgages, such as 
offering a guarantee for the securities from a government agency and changing the tax 
and legal treatment of these products.  It also suggested that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
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should be key players in the expansion of the secondary market, though it did not resolve 
the question about the appropriate level of public intervention in this area. 
Congress passed the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhanceme t Act of 1984, 
implementing many of the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Housing.  
This legislation greatly increased the availability of mortgage credit, drawing attention 
away from the long-time questions of how to increase the supply of credit and towards 
questions regarding the terms at which this credit would be offered.  By closely 
connecting the US housing finance system with capital markets around the world, the 
secondary market filled the gap in credit left by the declining thrifts.  In addition, the 
increased supply of credit benefited customers by lowering interest rates by an average of 
half a percent on those loans that could be sold in the secondary market.80  Although the 
secondary market has increased the supply of credit to the market and lowered the rates at 
which it is available, it may also have negatively affected some households who do not fit 
easily into the standardized underwriting guidelines r quired.81  
 The growth in the secondary market, starting in the mid-80s, was explosive.  In 
1984, some $62 billion of mortgage-backed securities w re issued.  By 2001, this number 
had grown to $1.2 trillion.82  As it became one of the primary sources of credit, the 
secondary market also helped maintain the liquidity of the market, smoothing the ups and 
downs that would have been experienced under the earli r systems.  It also broadened the 
investor base of housing by attracting mutual funds, pension funds, and foreign entities 
whose capital had previously not been invested in housing and further tying the housing 
market to the economy at large. 
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 The secondary market may have also extended the life of the 30-year fixed-rate 
mortgage.  In the early 1980s, the 11th District Federal Home Loan Bank proposed an 
adjustable-rate mortgage indexed to their cost of funds.  In order to make this product 
successful, savings and loan executives from the 11th District asked Freddie Mac to agree 
to buy these loans, creating a secondary market and greater liquidity.  They also 
requested that Freddie Mac cease purchasing 30-year fix d-rate mortgages, as they saw 
these as direct competitors to the ARMs.  Although Freddie Mac did agree to purchase 
the new loans, they did not agree to the second request, preserving the market for both 
types of loans.  Because of this secondary market int rvention, the United States is one of 
the only countries in the world which offers a mortgage product that is as advantageous 
to the consumer as the long-term, fixed-rate mortgage.83  
Since the introduction of a robust secondary market, many different kinds of loan 
products have been introduced.  Adjustable rate mortgages have allowed for the shifting 
of interest rate risk, with no-cost refinancing inte ded as the safety valve.84  Other exotic 
loan products have proliferated such as payment-option loans and interest-only loans, 
with so-called “affordable features.”  In addition, low regulatory requirements allowed 
for stated loans, by which the borrower’s income dos not need to be documented or 
verified.  Many of these exotic products, allowed under the loose regulations, would 
ultimately prove dangerous, as discussed in the final chapter.  
 Federal regulation gave the secondary market an additional advantage in 1989 
with the spread of risk-based capital requirements.  Under these rules from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, mortgage bcked securities were treated 
preferentially to mortgage whole loans, with GSE securities weighted at 20 percent, 
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GNMA securities weighted at 0 percent, and whole loans weighted at 50 percent, making 




During the 1980s, the pendulum of federal financial regulation in the United 
States swung sharply towards deregulation.  As limitations were relaxed on the types of 
investments that banks and savings and loans could make, investment decisions changed 
dramatically, and capital was redirected in new ways.  Though the capital requirements of 
the housing sector were never forgotten, they were not the focus of the changes in policy 
affecting the banks during this period.  In fact, distancing the savings and loans from their 
original focus on the needs of housing finance was at the core of the new policies.  The 
nature of their business, short-term demand deposits, had originally been the cause of 
their vulnerability to interest rate risk on long-term mortgages.  This mismatch had 
caused 1,043 thrifts to fail between 1986 and 1995, creating a huge drag on the economy 
as a whole and on the federal budget in particular.86  The new regulations were intended 
to allow the surviving thrifts to diversify their portfolios. 
Meanwhile, the secondary market expanded to fill the funding gap left by 
declining thrift investment in housing finance.  By linking mortgage markets with 
international capital markets, the GSEs successfully addressed the credit shortages that 
had long plagued the housing finance system.  With credit plentiful, the terms of credit 
took on increased importance, increasing affordability for more borrowers.   
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Deregulation policies were aimed at the macroeconomy.  As housing markets and 
other pieces of the financial sector have become increasingly linked, the federal 
government has used macroeconomic tools to address p oblems in the housing market.  
In doing so, they have addressed concerns related to the availability of financing, but 
have not addressed social welfare concerns such as ensuring that the financial industry 
lend responsibly and protect the interests of consumers who are less able to protect their 
own interests.  In addition, these policies do not address community development 
concerns such as ensuring that credit is provided in ways that will further community 
goals and build stable and secure neighborhoods.  Rather, these policies tend to support 
the freedom of the private markets to pursue profit-oriented activities. 
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Chapter 5: Subprime Crisis and the Return to Regulation 
The Foreclosure Crisis 
From 2000 to 2005, homeowners across the country saw m jor increases in their 
home values.  Median house prices peaked in October of 2005, and then lost 18 percent 
of their real value over the following thirty months, the sharpest decline in fifty years.87  
At the end of this period, a sharp downward spiral began, and home prices went into 
freefall.  The earlier part of the decade also saw a very large number of refinances and 
home equity loans, as homeowners withdrew equity from their homes for a number of 
other purposes.  As long as housing prices continued to increase, more and more equity 
was withdrawn from houses.  Meanwhile, other borrowers took on exotic loans with 
unusual features, assuming that they would be able to r finance into more traditional loan 
products later.   Still others accepted these loans without fully understanding the terms, 
whether as the result of predatory behaviors on the part of lenders or as the result of 
personal negligence.  As a result, as house values have come crashing down, many 
owners have negative equity left in their homes.  These owners cannot afford to sell or 
refinance, as they owe more than their house is worth, and increasing numbers are being 
pushed into default and, eventually, foreclosure.   
Subprime Crisis 
The foreclosure crisis has not affected all loans equally.  The first wave of 
foreclosures was heavily concentrated in subprime mortgages, loans made to “riskier” 
borrowers that carried higher, and often adjustable, interest rates.  The percentage of 
subprime or high cost loans originated increased dramatically in recent years, going from 
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about 10 percent in 2003 to almost 33 percent in 2006.88  While subprime loans were a 
way of making mortgage credit available to households who would not otherwise have 
qualified for credit, their use has been widely questioned, and they are commonly 
associated with predatory practices.  Many subprime loans carried adjustable interest 
rates, which often started with a discounted “teaser rate” to attract borrowers, but would 
then reset to a higher rate.  At the beginning of 2006, these initial rates were, on average, 
about 2.3 percentage points lower than the comparable te for fixed-rate loans, but, as a 
result of the rapid deterioration of subprime loan performance through the year, began 
2007 at an average discount of only .5 percent.89     
Predatory Lending 
High cost loans were concentrated in low-income andminority areas; in 2006, 
more than 40 percent of loans made on properties in low-income communities were high-
cost, and over 45 percent of loans made on properties in low-income, minority 
neighborhoods were high-cost.  These numbers stand in stark contrast to the 23 percent of 
loans made in middle-income, white communities, and 15 percent of loans made in high-
income, white communities that were high-cost.90  In addition, the incidence of loans 
with “affordable features” was much higher in the most expensive markets, where 
borrowers were already stretched to afford homes.91  In order to continue attracting new 
borrowers, lenders continued to lower down payment r quirements, increase LTV ratios, 
and provided loans to borrowers without verification f income.  It was assumed that 
rising house values would serve as the safety valve, nd that even if borrowers could not 
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make their payments, the banks would be able to recup their investment from the sale of 
the asset.   
Changes in the Underwriting Process 
Another major change that occurred during this period was the separation of the 
underwriting, servicing, and holding of loans.  Increasing numbers of loans were 
processed by mortgage brokers, who were compensated on a commission basis.  These 
brokers had no long-term financial stake in the performance of the loans, and were 
therefore incentivized to sell products with the highest commission, not necessarily those 
which were best suited to the borrower’s needs.  Originating banks, too, lost their 
financial incentives to maintain the integrity of their underwriting, since a large 
percentage of their loans would be quickly sold on the secondary market rather than held 
in portfolio.  Because the secondary market processes of packaging and securitization 
pooled large numbers of loans together, it became virtually impossible to assess the true 
value of the underlying mortgages.   As a result, mortgage originators lost their incentive 
to maintain the quality of their underwriting.  And finally, the incentives of the credit 
rating agencies, who were supposed to provide investors with information about the 
quality of the securities, were also misaligned.  They were paid directly by the institutions 
issuing the securities, and therefore were incentivized to give higher ratings in order to 
attract future business.  From beginning to end, the lending process became fraught with 
economic disincentives to maintaining high underwriting standards.  
These changes shifted emphasis from loan quality to loan volume, increasing the 
total volume of outstanding mortgage debt.  However, many of these new loans did not 
last long.  Defaults and foreclosures skyrocketed to their highest levels since record 
keeping began in 1974; the 2002-2006 annual average of 455,000 foreclosures nearly 
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doubled to 940,000 by the end of 2007, a number which as only continued to rise.92  
Moreover, the subprime share of these defaulted loans rose from 4.6 in 2006 to 8.7 by the 
end of 2007.  Even more alarming is the share of subprime loans with adjustable interest 
rates, which made up 13.4 of defaulted loans in 2007.93 
Housing Prices Decline 
US Housing prices had increased steadily through the first half of the decade, but 
peaked in October of 2005.94  Between mid-2007 and the end of 2008, home values in the 
United States were estimated to have fallen by over$700 billion.  Despite this decline, 
home equity still makes up the largest segment of household wealth.95  Along with the 
value of the underlying assets, the value of securities has also dropped precipitously.  
Investors lost confidence in the underlying value of the securities, and demand for these 
investments dried up.  With little to no new capital coming in and investors demanding 
repayment, many funds collapsed and mortgage companies found themselves unable to 
pay back their obligations.96  
Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis 
  As the foreclosure crisis unfolds, fingers have be n pointed in many directions.  
It is clear that federal regulators acted too slowly to curtail some of the most abusive 
practices.  Regulators did not issue guidelines for negative amortization and interest-only 
loans, two of the most troublesome of the exotic products, until 2006.  It was not until 
mid-2008 that they amended the Truth in Lending Act (also known as Regulation Z) to 
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require lenders to verify incomes and assets of borrowers and curtail practices which 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke characterized as “unfair or deceptive acts and 
practices by lenders [which] resulted in the extension of many loans, particularly, high-
cost loans, that were inappropriate for or misled the borrower.”97 
 Two of the most commonly cited culprits are the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) and the Affordable Housing Goals which Congress sets for the GSEs.  These two 
federal initiatives were intended to “democratize cr dit” and bring homeownership within 
reach of a larger swath of the population.  The Community Reinvestment Act was passed 
in 1977 to encourage federally-insured depository institutions “to help meet the credit 
needs of the local communities in which they are chartered, consistent with the safe and 
sound operation of such institutions.”98  Critics have argued that this legislation has 
forced a particular allocation of credit by lenders.  The data, drawn mostly from the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), show that only about nine percent of the high-
cost loans to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods were covered by the CRA.  
Evidence shows that a large portion of these loans were originated by institutions not 
subject to the CRA, and that while banks did underwrite some high-priced loans within 
their CRA assessment districts, they did so at a significantly lower rate relative to the 
overall market.99  In addition, research has shown that, in general, CRA lending, when 
adhering to “safety and soundness” principles, has been “overwhelmingly profitable” to 
banks.100 
There is also significant evidence against the claim that the Affordable Housing 
Goals of the GSEs are the main culprit.  Beginning in 1992 with the Federal Housing 
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Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, Congress began setting targets for the 
GSEs, encouraging them to fund loans to low-income households and to underserved 
neighborhoods, and to “lead the industry in affordable lending.”101  In response, the GSEs 
created special affordable programs, which allowed for reduced down payments, 
increased flexibility in credit and employment history, and higher debt-to-income-ratios.     
It is clear that the first wave of troublesome loans was not originated or 
securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as subprime loans were not a major part of 
their business until 2005, several years after these loans had been made. Though they 
were not the original cause of the problem, the GSEs did join the market for products 
with low credit ratings, and may have “followed the market down.”102  These investments 
made up more than half of each company’s  credit losses in the second quarter of 2008, 
but only 11 percent of Fannie Mae’s and 10 percent of Freddie Mac’s portfolios.  The 
average loan amount was about $170,000 and the average loan-to-value ratio was below 
75 percent, excluding them from the affordable housing programs.103  Taken together, 
this evidence suggests that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did add to the overall troubles of 
the housing and financial markets, but not primarily as a result of their affordable housing 
programs.    
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Chapter 6: Making Home Affordable and the Future of US Housing 
Finance 
Making Home Affordable 
In March of 2009, Congress and the Obama administration introduced the Making 
Home Affordable program, a three-prong plan meant to address the foreclosure crisis and 
assist between 7 and 9 million households.  The first of the initiatives is a refinancing 
program intended to help borrowers with high-interest loans refinance into fixed-rate 
mortgages and take advantage of historically low interest rates.  The second is a $75 
billion program to encourage loan modifications for 3 to 4 million homeowners.  Finally, 
the third initiative seeks to maintain low mortgage rates by encouraging confidence in 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
 The home refinance program seeks to assist 4 to 5 million borrowers who cannot 
refinance because their house value has declined with the overall market, leaving them 
without the requisite owners’ equity to secure a new loan.  Through this program, 
borrowers with loans that are owned or guaranteed by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae will 
be able to refinance into lower-rate mortgages through these institutions.  This provision 
will only assist homeowners who are current on their payments, and does not offer 
assistance to already distressed borrowers.   
 The second prong of the program will provide loan modifications to borrowers 
who are “at risk” as well as those who have already fallen behind on their payments.  
Through modifications of existing loans, the program seeks to lower households’ 
monthly payments so as to make them affordable to the individual households’ current 
circumstances.  This program is only available for loans below the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) conforming limit of $729,750.   
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The loan modifications will be subject to specific guidelines issued by the 
Treasury, and will first require lenders to lower monthly payments to no more than 38 
percent of the household’s income.  From there, the program will provide a dollar-for-
dollar match until the debt-to-income ratio is reduced to 31 percent.  After five years, 
lenders may raise the interest rate by one percent annually until it reaches the conforming 
loan survey rate in place at the time of the modification.  Loan modifications will begin 
with interest rate reductions down to two percent, after which point lenders may extend 
the amortization period to forty years.  If this is still insufficient to bring monthly 
payments within 31% of borrowers’ income, then lendrs may forebear principal at zero 
percent interest.  Alternatively, lenders may elect to reduce the principal balance until the 
31 percent target is reached.   
 To incentivize successful loan modifications, the program offers an up-front cash 
payment of $1,000 to the servicer of any eligible loan modified under the approved terms.  
In addition, servicers will receive a payment of $1,000 per year for the first three years if 
the borrower remains current.  Finally, servicers will receive an additional $500 (and 
mortgage holders will receive $1,500) for loans modifie  for “at risk” borrowers who are 
still current on payments, as these loans have the highest probability of success.  
Borrowers are also eligible to receive up to $1,000 per year for five years as long as they 
remain current on their modified payments.  An additional $10 billion has been allocated 
for “Home Price Decline Payments” to encourage servic s to modify currently viable 
loans rather than pursuing foreclosure out of fear th t home values will continue to 
decline.  These funds will be used to offset losses hould values continue to decline.     
Finally, the Making Home Affordable program seeks to encourage confidence in 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  To do so, the Treasury has increased its support of the 
GSEs through funds appropriated in 2008.  Additionally, the Treasury will continue to 
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buy securities issued by the agency in order to maintain liquidity in the secondary market.  
The GSEs will also be authorized to hold an additional $50 billion of loans in portfolio, 
increasing their total to $900 billion each.     
The program aims to strike a political balance, but in doing so falls short on many 
points.  The “common sense” provision limiting mortgages eligible for modification to 
the FHFA conforming limit of $729,750 is hardly common sense, as it makes no 
distinction between price differentials in local markets; while this may be a reasonable 
limit for high-priced markets, it is an exorbitant limit in other places, and thus fails to 
adequately target federal support.  Though it is successful in aligning the previously 
unaligned incentives for lenders, servicers, and borrowers, it uses large amounts of public 
money to encourage lenders and servicers to solve the problems which they are largely 
responsible for causing.  The program includes several provisions meant to discourage 
moral hazard on the part of borrowers, but does nothi g to hold those who created the 
current situation accountable for past actions.  The other major shortcoming of the 
program is its relatively short focus.  By loosening the restrictions on the affordability of 
loan modifications after only five years, it is not creating a permanent solution, but rather 
expending enormous subsidies that will simply forestall the problem without fully 
addressing it.   
 
Learning from the Past 
The Home Owners Loan Corporation was the federal government’s first attempt 
to intervene in mortgage markets as a holder of mortgages.  Amidst the turmoil of the 
Great Depression, the HOLC was instituted to act as a lender of last resort.  As such, it 
was able to set its own terms, creating its own system for appraisals, limiting its exposure 
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to 80% of assessed value, and refinancing only those mortgages which were deemed 
viable.  Under the HOLC terms, lenders were often forced to accept a portion of the loss 
through a reduction in outstanding principal.  Despite losing some of the value, which in 
an economic sense had already been lost to the declining value of the asset, they gained 
liquidity, as non-performing loans were replaced by salable bonds.   
A similar model would be appropriate under the current context, using an arm of 
the federal government to purchase and refinance loans.  Rather than providing incentives 
to financial institutions to modify loan terms, this could be done more efficiently by 
simply purchasing the loans and refinancing them, taking advantage of historically low 
interest rates and the federal government’s low cost of capital to refinance viable 
mortgages, thus preventing foreclosure, maintaining the value of the homes, and 
providing liquidity to the financial sector.  It would also better align incentives, 
penalizing financial institutions for underwriting loans that were not sustainable from 
origination.  Although the housing finance landscape today is much more complicated 
than that of the 1930s, the form of the crisis is similar.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can 
be used as government agents, paralleling the functions of the HOLC. 
 
Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
 In July of 2008, the Bush Administration seized contr l of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and placed them into conservatorship of their new regulator, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency.  Both companies had reported t emendous losses, with Fannie 
Mae reporting negative income of $58.7 billion in 2008, greater than their total net profits 
since 1992.104  By placing them into a conservatorship, the federal government made 
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explicit the guarantee of federal backing that had formerly been only implicit.  In 
announcing the takeover, Treasury Secretary Harry Paulson said, “these enterprises pose 
a systemic risk and they cannot continue in their cur ent form. Government support needs 
to be either explicit or nonexistent, and structured to resolve the conflict between public 
and private purposes.”105  Since July of 2008, plans to restore confidence i the mortgage 
markets and to stave off further declines in the housing market have increasingly relied 
on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as key participants.   
 Though they currently remain in limbo between public and private ownership, it 
is unlikely that Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac will ever r turn to public ownership, at least 
not in their current forms.  As Congress and the Obama Administration continue to draw 
the companies into the economic recovery strategies, the companies increasingly lose 
decision-making power and autonomy, jeopardizing their future independence.  
Additionally, even if the companies could return to profitability, current estimates say 
that it could take as many as 100 years for them to pay off their government debt.106  
Finally, in an era of increased government control and regulation, it is unlikely that 
legislators will be eager to cede control of these powerful entities.  At this time, however, 
the question of what to do with the GSEs is not being officially discussed.    
 
Overinvestment in Housing 
Research shows that about one third of the US owner-occupied housing stock 
constructed before 1976 would not have been built if not for the lowered after-tax costs 
of homeownership relative to other investments.107  Because of all of the incentives 
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provided to homeownership through direct subsidy, the GSEs, and the tax code, 
households have been incentivized to concentrate their investments in housing rather than 
other assets that might be more productive were it not for policy interventions.  By 
allocating a large portion of their investments to a single asset, they also decrease the 
diversity within their individual portfolios.  Giving housing an advantage over other 
consumer interests creates greater investment in housing, detracting from investment in 
vehicles such as stocks, bonds, and mutual funds.  Housing that would otherwise not have 
been built drives out other investments that would have been more profitable before 
taxes, lowering the GDP by an estimated $200 billion in 1998.108  For this reason, 
households have come to view their house largely as a financial investment and not just 
as a home. 
The incentives given to homeownership are largely the results of macroeconomic 
policies, with little attention paid to the social nd community outcomes they create.  
These incentives primarily benefit higher-income households, and do not address overall 
community health or stability.  In fact, they draw investment away from many lower-
income communities which are dominated by renters.  Finally, these policies do not 
address the chronic underinvestment in housing for low-income households.  By focusing 
on macroeconomic objectives, these policies measure only financial benefits, ignoring all 
other facets of housing.   
 
Changing the Conversation 
Over the years, homeownership has been touted both for its social and economic 
benefits.  These benefits have served as the justification for a long line of government 
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programs and initiatives which have promoted and subsidized homeownership.  The 
emphasis on homeownership as a wealth-building investm nt has increased, and, as 
house prices rose sharply in the late 1990s and early 2000s, has come to overshadow 
many of the other services that come from a house.  Households invested beyond their 
means in homeownership, and often used their home as a source of equity.  In fact, the 
majority of subprime loans were made to owners seeking to refinance, not to purchase 
new property.109  For a large number of these borrowers, refinancing was a means for 
tapping into the investment value of their home. 
As Donald Degollado, a housing counselor said, “it’s time to change the value 
statement of homeownership.”  It no longer suffices to treat housing primarily as an 
economic investment, as doing so has brought the entire housing finance system to its 
knees.  Instead, housing must be addressed through a combination of macroeconomic, 
social, and community development policies.  By ignori g these other outcomes, past 
macroeconomic policies have actually lowered the economic value of homeownership, as 
demonstrated by the current crisis.  Policies must focus on the social and neighborhood 
values of homeownership, not simply the wealth-building potential of the investment.  
The recent crisis has shown that homeownership can be a risky way of amassing wealth, 
if not least so because it discourages many households fr m adequately diversifying their 
portfolios across different investment types.   
The idea of homeownership as the predominant form of wealth accumulation is 
also problematic from the perspective of federal policy.  There is a pervasive gap 
between the homeownership rates of whites, of whom r ughly three quarters are 
homeowners, and minorities.  The gap is most dramatic between white and black 
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homeownership, with only about half of black households owning their own homes.  
Moreover, research shows that this gap grew between 1985 and 2005, even after 
controlling for income, education, and immigration status.110  Other research shows that 
parental wealth and ownership are significant indicators of a household’s ownership 
status.   
Discriminatory practices, both public and private, have been institutionalized 
through federal policy’s emphasis on the promotion of homeownership.  Not only do 
renters have lower wealth and fewer opportunities to build wealth than their homeowner 
counterparts, but their children are likely to face the same fate.  Many minority 
households were excluded from neighborhoods by FHA redlining and private restrictive 
covenants in the 1950s and 60s, but the effect of this exclusion is still felt today.  These 
policies encouraged racial segregation, and even today “residential segregation costs 
African American homeowners enormous amounts of money by suppressing their home 
equity in comparison to White homeowners,” decreasing the investment value of 
homeownership for African Americans.111  Therefore, federal policies that subsidize 
homeownership and promote it relative to other investm nts perpetuate and increase 
current wealth gaps and societal inequalities.     
As a policy for the promotion of wealth building, homeownership has failed many 
people.  Due to the lumpy nature of housing and the significant obstacles to first-time 
homeownership, many people are excluded.  Recent experi nce, however, shows that 
even those who have been able to purchase a home are not always better off for having 
done so.  Subprime loans were underwritten disproportionately for low-income and 
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minority households, and these loans have faced the most problems with the housing 
downturn and economic slowdown.  Many of these borrowers are now finding 
themselves worse off than they were before becoming homeowners.  A shift away from 
the promotion of homeownership relative to other investments is necessary, and 




One way of doing this is through the promotion of shared equity homeownership, 
which preserves the social value of housing but lowers both its investment value and the 
associated risk.  In many ways, shared equity homeown rship falls between traditional 
ownership and rental, creating a spectrum of tenure alternatives rather than two discrete 
tenure choices.  Shared equity homeownership encompasses a range of models which 
seek to make homeownership safer and more accessible to individual households while 
creating long-term affordable housing and preserving the value of public subsidies.  In 
this way, macroeconomic policies are being used for the purpose of creating positive 
social welfare and community development outcomes.  Included in this category are 
community land trusts and various programs which use deed restrictions to maintain 
affordability.  Although there is great variation i the specific terms that each program 
uses, the basic models are quite simple.   
Community land trusts (CLTs) are organizations which own the land upon which 
housing is built.  Homeowners purchase a ground lease from the CLT, giving them the 
right to use the land, though they fully own the improvements.  Traditionally, increases in 
housing prices are largely due to land appreciation, s  by separating the value of the 
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house from the value of the land, long term affordability can be more readily preserved.  
The terms of each agreement vary, but ground leases typically include provisions limiting 
the future sale price and the division of any equity appreciation between the owner and 
the CLT.  The ground lease may also restrict the eligibility of buyers based on such 
criteria as income and residency, making sure that future owners who benefit from the 
program come from the target population. 
The second major paradigm for shared equity homeownrship is that of deed 
restricted programs.  Deed restrictions work similarly to ground leases in that they restrict 
the terms of resale.  Deed restrictions are more flexib e than community land trusts in that 
they do not require an entity that owns the underlying land, but rather need only an 
agency to oversee the enforcement of the restrictions.  Like CLTs, they can employ a 
wide range of formulas to calculate the way in which equity appreciation will be split 
between the homeowner and the sponsor.   
The current crisis is an ideal opportunity for the d velopment of large-scale 
shared equity homeownership programs.  The public sector is currently making enormous 
investments to restore the vitality of the housing market.  However, without some kind of 
shared equity approach, these expenditures will be on -time subsidies.  The major 
advantages that shared equity models offer are their ability to target assistance and 
preserve the value of public subsidy.  They offer a tradeoff to buyers, allowing them the 
benefit of the subsidy so long as they live in their home and the opportunity to share in 
any upside potential, but also protecting the long-term value of the subsidy so that it can 
be recycled for the benefit of future households.  There is currently a glut of homes on the 
market, many of them owned by lenders and other investors as foreclosed assets.  A 
shared equity program would not only help many households to purchase homes, but 
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would also help to dispose of these assets, restore the health of the market, and create a 
permanent stock of affordable housing.  
Shared equity homeownership offers a range of benefits to local municipalities.  
By bringing properties back into use, they can increase their property tax revenues, the 
principal source of funding for most local governments.  A shared equity homeownership 
program would also require local control as the mechanisms must be tailored to local 
circumstances.  Unlike the majority of federal macroe onomic policies, funding for 
shared equity programs would allow local governments to meet their specific community 
development goals, which are largely overlooked by federal policies.    
While these programs are far from revolutionary, they ave not received sufficient 
attention as potential solutions to current problems.  The Making Home Affordable Plan 
does not have any provisions for subsidy preservation or recapture.  It aims only to solve 
the current crisis, but lacks the foresight to create a lasting public resource.  In addition, 
because a large portion of the expenditure has been allocated to loan modification 
through private banks, this subsidy will be going to lenders rather than into sustainable 
public resources.  Conversely, shared-equity homeown rship programs offer an 
opportunity to create sound economic policies while achieving the social goals of 
affordable housing and the community development goals f neighborhood stability. 
 
Conclusions 
The United States is currently in the midst of the worst downturn in housing 
markets since the Great Depression.  For years, homeownership has been considered the 
“American Dream,” with substantial federal resources poured into its preservation and 
expansion.  After years of home price appreciation and expanded homeownership, there 
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is now a significant contraction which has affected not only house prices, but the 
availability of credit and the health of the economy as a whole.  While the crisis is 
certainly the source of significant challenges, it also provides opportunities for rethinking 
the role of housing and homeownership in federal policy and in American society as a 
whole.  The time is ripe for marrying macroeconomic, social welfare, and community 
development policies, replacing these distinct spheres with sound, sustainable policies 
that create better outcomes for individuals, communities, and the economy as a whole.   
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